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This article reviews the position of the population of the Netherlands in the context of
the demographic characteristics of the other seventeen major Western European
countries. It attempts to show the ways in which the population of the Netherlands is
part of the European mainstream and where it diverges in various interesting ways.
Where possible, a (partial) explanation for this divergence will be given
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1. Demographic variety in Europe and its future
Differences in the average demographic characteristics of countries reflect important
contrasts in the way that their inhabitants live.  Willekens (1999) comments:
‘Demographic events are milestones in the lives of people. Most events that occur
between birth and death that have a notable effect upon a person’s life are demographic
events. […] They mark transitions between stages or episodes of life and are the basic
components of a ‘life structure’. Demographic events […] constitute the skeleton of
human life.’ European integration and convergence, both socio-economic and political,
is one of the major issues of the 21
st century. International differences in the aspects that
are studied by demographers, reflect and contribute to those patterns of similarity or
divergence. Some countries are regarded, or regard themselves, as being somewhat
different from other European societies in respect of their demographic and other
behaviour. In some cases distinctive behaviour is interpreted as social malaise, for
example the high level of teenage birth in Great Britain (Coleman and Chandola, 1999).
Other distinctive characteristics, for example the diversity of family forms best
developed in some Scandinavian countries, are regarded more as a universal model for
the future, with divergent countries simply being at an earlier stage of development
(Roussel, 1994).
Underlying much of this discussion is an assumption of future demographic
convergence, which is welcomed as an indicator of the minimization of differences
between European populations. Empirical evidence, however, does not always support
such assumptions (Bosveld, 1996; Kuijsten, 1996). The Netherlands is a very interesting
example in this European context. It is one of the more prosperous countries of Europe,
usually moderate in its politics and its attitudes, internationally oriented and apparently
lacking salient pathological demographic features. Nonetheless in some demographic
characteristics it is quite exceptional and has been so for decades. Might the Dutch
pattern of ‘moderate exceptionalism’ be a model for Western Europe’s future rather
than the ‘progressive’ patterns of Scandinavia, or is it just a transient inheritance from a
more diverse European past? This article, which builds upon some preliminary work
published in Dutch (Coleman 2001, tr. Garssen), reviews the position of the population
of the Netherlands in comparison with the demographic characteristics of the other
seventeen major Western European countries. It attempts to show the ways in which the
population of the Netherlands is part of the European mainstream and where it diverges
in various interesting ways, and offers some comments on possible future developments.Demographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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2. The context of Dutch population trends
To an outsider, the demographic characteristics of the Dutch population reflect the
status of the Netherlands in general, that is to say, a country inhabited by people
relatively free of exceptional problems, living a comfortable life. The Netherlands
enjoys a high standard of living and relatively low levels of inequality. Although
recently jolted out of its belief that political violence would be ‘un-Dutch’, it remains on
the whole happy with its constitution and at ease with its history, with no territorial
disputes with its neighbours.  Neither is it threatened by breakaway movements from
dissident provinces or minorities. The ancient religious division into Protestant and
Catholic, which once defined economic, social and private life to a remarkable degree,
has lost much of its force with new attitudes to religion. A secular Samson has brought
down the old pillars of Dutch society.
Religious divisions apart, in its lack of enduring ancient ethnic divisions the
Netherlands is unique among the larger countries of Europe, showing a degree of
homogeneity only seen elsewhere in a few smaller countries, such as Denmark. This
tends to make for tranquil demography. Like all other major countries, however, it has
acquired post-war immigrant minorities from the third world, with all the problems
associated with coping with new cultural and demographic diversity.
3. Demographic indicators
Let us first see how the Netherlands compares with the Western European average with
a number of demographic indicators, and how its position has changed in the second
half of the twentieth century (Table 1). Wherever possible the comparisons are made
with the average of 18 Western European countries (EUR-18; ‘Western’ in the broad
Cold War sense, including the Netherlands itself) and also with the averages of the
seven countries of Northern Europe, the seven countries of Western Europe proper and
the four Southern European countries. ‘Eastern’ Europe is excluded; its populations,
like its economies in a state of transition, cannot yet offer meaningful comparisons. As
we are interested in the comparison of populations, not of the average European person,
the unweighted averages are employed. Comparisons will not usually go beyond 1998,
to ensure a full complement of European countries.Demographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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EUR-18            Netherlands
                                       Rank (4)   (out of)
1950 1998 1950 1998 1950 1998 1950 1998 1950 1998            1950           1998
TFR 2.84 1.78 2.42 1.55 2.64 1.26 2.63 1.57 3.06 1.63 5 18 9 18
ASFR 15-19 38.4 15.7 19.7 9.6 15.9 11.5 25.6 12.4 12.4 6.2 14 14 17 18
% births age
30+
39.4 45.2 38.7 42.7 41.4 47.4 39.6 44.8 49.9 53.4 1 13 4 18
e0 males 68.0 75.1 64.7 74.7 60.8 74.5 64.5 74.8 70.4 75.2 3 15 7 18
e0 females 71.5 80.4 69.2 81.1 65.4 80.9 68.8 80.8 72.9 80.6 3 15 11 18
IMR 32.5 4.4 47.1 5.1 65.6 5.7 45.5 4.9 25.2 5.2 16 18 9 18
% births non-
marital
8.9 45.1 6.6 22.4 8.5 11.5 7.8 28.8 1.5 20.8 16 16 10 18
Age at first
marriage
28.5 27.1 26.5 27.5 25.6 27.6 8 18
Age at first
birth
27.3 28.0 28.1 27.8 28.7 3 18
Total first
marriage rate
0.57 0.55 0.66 0.58 0.58 10 18
Total divorce
rate
0.44 0.4 0.15 0.35 0.36 11 17
Potential
support ratio
7.15 4.74 6.78 4.44 9.05 4.19 7.43 4.50 8.14 5.08 6 18 3 18
Population per
km2  (5)
56 68 160 225 90 115 104 139 309 462 1 18 1 18
Sources: Council of Europe; Eurostat; national demographic yearbooks
Note: data on divorce and mean ages at first marriage and first birth not generally available for 1950
(1) Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, United Kingdom and Sweden
(2) Belgium, Germany, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland
(3) Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
(4) Countries are ranked in descending order of the value of the variable, i.e. a low value gives a low rank
(5) Total area, including inland waters
4. Population density
One demographic fact that everyone knows is that the Netherlands is exceptionally
crowded, even more so than neighbouring Belgium. Only Malta and San Marino have a
larger number of inhabitants per square kilometer. Population density in the Netherlands
is more than three times the European average. The disparity between the Netherlands
and the European average has been increasing since the end of World War II, as the
Dutch population has grown faster than that of the rest of Europe. This fast rate of
population increase explains why the Netherlands presently holds first position by a
large margin, but had a lower ranking at the beginning of the twentieth century.  The
population tripled in one century, and the consequent increase in population pressureDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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was only to a minor extent offset by land reclamation. At the end of the century the land
area was 2090 square kilometers larger than at the beginning, an increase of 6.5 percent.
During the first seventy years of the century a high birth rate played the largest role in
sustaining population growth. Since then, the direct and indirect effects of immigration
have become the main determinants.
The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium in this respect are
particularly interesting. A century ago, there were seven million Belgians, compared
with five million Dutch. In a hundred years, the number of Belgians increased by only
three million, whereas the Netherlands added eleven million people. The Belgian birth
rates were, at all times, lower than those of the Netherlands, whereas the death rates
were usually higher.
The Dutch population density is now about four times that of France, which partly
explains the seasonal mass migration of Dutch cars, caravans and tents that is so
conspicuous on the roads south in summer. Population pressure, it may be assumed, has
inclined Dutch demographic research to be unusually pre-occupied with planning and its
demographic aspects in a tightly packed environment. What exquisite politeness and
self-control is to Japan, planning is to the Netherlands.
5. Mortality
Life expectancy in 1998, 75.2 for men and 80.6 for women, ranks seventh and eleventh
respectively in Europe; just about the average, as is infant mortality at 5.2 infant deaths
per thousand births per year. This is hardly an adverse comparison, as the Dutch level
approaches that of about 4, which - also in view of recent reversals -  may be a
minimum where to descend below would involve disproportionate and socially
unacceptable investments. The Dutch infant mortality rate is, moreover, pushed slightly
upwards by the high average age at childbirth and relatively large share in the
population of women of non-western origin (Van der Wilk et al., 2001). As their infants
are exposed to an about 30% increased risk of mortality, and as only about a third of
this excess mortality can be attributed to their generally disadvantaged economic
position (Van Duin, 2002), it would be hardly realistic to expect significant mortality
reductions in the short term.
Mortality, however, is one of the few areas where the Netherlands has lost ground
compared with other countries. In 1950, the Netherlands stood out third in Europe in
expectation of life - six years above the European average (over a standard deviation
higher) for both sexes. Infant mortality was one of the lowest anywhere. This pre-
eminent position has given way to one of relative statistical mediocrity (Figure 1). The
increase in life expectancy from 1960-1996 was, after Denmark, the lowest in Europe.Demographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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In 1975, age-specific mortality rates of men aged 45-74 years were even higher than
they had been in 1950. Although this position had improved by the end of the century,
the Netherlands does not display the impressive and unexpected decline in mortality (in
both sexes) among the old and oldest-old, aged 85 years and over, which is
characteristic of most other European countries since the 1980s (Van Hoorn and
Garssen, 1999).
Figure 1: Trend in expectation of life at birth, males and females, the Netherlands
and EUR-18, 1950-2000
Regional differences in mortality in the Netherlands are modest compared with its
Belgian and German neighbours (Van der Veen, 1994). However, the socio-economic
differentials in urban mortality in the Netherlands are not, contrary to expectation, much
smaller than those observed in the UK and some other Anglo-Saxon populations (Kunst
and Mackenbach, 1996). The class difference with respect to health are, furthermore,
even more striking than those with respect to mortality: Dutchmen with a high socio-
economic status live, on average, twelve years longer in good health than their
compatriots with a low status (Van de Water et al., 1996). The NWO Priorities
Research Programme (Kunst et al., 1999) has highlighted the effects of religion in
retarding decline in infant mortality in the past, including some surprisingly un-Dutch
low levels of hygiene, and resistance to breast feeding in some sections of the
community. More recently, as elsewhere, smoking habits, even more than diet, have
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partly because the later adoption of smoking by women is now making its effects felt.
Within the European Union, Danish and Dutch women are the heaviest smokers (Van
der Wilk et al., 2001).
6. Fertility
Until the late 1960s, fertility in the Netherlands was conspicuously higher than the
European average (3.06 compared with 2.63; the fifth highest in Europe for most of that
time and about one standard deviation above the average). For a while, until the end of
the 1980s, the pattern was reversed when Dutch fertility fell below the EUR-18 average,
although remaining similar to the level in its near neighbours in Western Europe. Today,
the Dutch TFR is again somewhat above the EUR-18 average (EUR-18 average 1.61 in
2000; the Netherlands 1.72; Figure 2). As in most of the European countries, there has
been no real trend, up or down, for the past quarter of a century. Women who have
completed their families, now in their late forties, have had 1.8 children on average.
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The high post-war fertility in the Netherlands was perhaps surprising in view of the high
density of population, the perception, officially recognised, of over-population and,
despite official encouragement, the absence of a major recent emigration tradition. Such
a tradition sustained the high Irish birth rate up to the middle of the twentieth century,
although in very different circumstances. The relatively high post-war fertility in the
Netherlands is usually accounted for as a symptom of the competition, demographic and
otherwise, which then existed in the ‘pillarised’ Dutch society between the Catholic and
various Protestant denominations (Bagley, 1973; Engelen and Hillebrand, 1986). This
does not explain, however, why fertility levels in the Catholic enclaves in the northern
part of the Netherlands were rather similar to those in their Protestant surroundings
(Hofstee, 1981).
The rapid descent from high fertility after the 1960s was a symptom of a radical
restructuring of Dutch society at that time. In a re-appraisal of their relationship with the
Divinity, and in particular His injunctions on fruitfulness, multiplication and marriage
within the faith, the pillars which had formerly held up the separateness of Dutch society
and possibly encouraged demographic competition between segregated communities,
crumbled rapidly away to stumps of their former selves. At the same time as the birth
rate declined, marriages between Protestants and Catholics, formerly rare, became
frequent (Van Heer, 1966; De Hoog, 1979), in parallel with similar changes elsewhere
in Europe (Coleman, 1992).
These ancient indigenous cultural differences have not vanished, but they no longer
dominate the Dutch demographic scene as they used to. The Netherlands is now a
relatively homogeneous society compared with others in Western Europe in respect of
social and geographical variation in economic and demographic characteristics.
Religion apart, it is happily devoid of the ancient ethnic divisions which are assuming
greater political significance elsewhere, in for example Belgium, Spain, Italy, the UK
and even France.  The new ethnic divisions arising from immigration are, of course,
something else.
One aspect of this homogeneity is illustrated by variation in the TFR between
provinces, as expressed by the coefficient of variation between provinces in each
country. In this respect, at least, it shows the Netherlands to be in the middle of the
range of European provincial variability in fertility, more varied than the UK and
Sweden, at about the same level as France and Germany, but much less varied than
Spain (Table 2). The main contributors to this variety are the persistent modest
differences in fertility between the predominantly rural and predominantly urban
provinces, as well as the exceptional position of Flevoland. This young province,
consisting of reclaimed land, has a particularly high fertility rate. It is particularly
attractive to those who wish to start a family and who are looking for an affordable
home and garden in a neighbourhood that is safe for children. In general, however, theDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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restricted size and geographical variety of the Netherlands compared with other
European countries means that it has no really remote or inaccessible rural areas where
unusual demographic characteristics could persist.
Table 2: Standard deviations in TFR at provincial level, selected countries, most
recent years













Sweden 1998 8847.6 8 1105.95 1.49 0.030
UK (3) 1998 52271.4 33 1583.98 1.70 0.073
Austria 1998 8057.4 9 895.27 1.33 0.115
Belgium 1995 10130.6 11 920.96 1.55 0.118
France 1997 58493.1 22 2658.78 1.70 0.119
Netherlands 1998 15654.2 12 1304.52 1.61 0.137
Portugal 1998 9957.3 7 1422.47 1.46 0.154
Italy 1996 57366.8 20 2868.34 1.17 0.156
Finland 1998 5147.3 6 857.88 1.68 0.158
Greece 1998 10511 13 808.54 1.29 0.165
Spain 1998 39347.9 18 2185.99 1.17 0.247
(1) Ranked in ascending order of standard deviation per country
(2) NUTS-2 level, including NUTS-1 areas where not subdivided into NUTS-2 areas
(3) England and Wales only, excluding Scotland and Northern Ireland
In the Netherlands fertility continues little affected by its marital or non-marital
context. Marital fertility in the Netherlands actually remains rather high by European
standards. The marital share in the TFR stands at about 1.3, higher than the overall
fertility in Southern Europe. As the NWO report comments, ‘welfare benefits allow
family formation even if the individual economic future looks grim’ (Van Wissen and
Dykstra, 1999). Fertility outside marriage remains relatively low, in spite of a doubling
of the rate since the mid-1990s. Only a quarter of all births were illegitimate in 2000, a
share that is well below the European average. As most of this non-marital fertility
concerns desired children of cohabiting parents, the recent increase is not reflected in a
similar increase in the number of one-parent families. At present, one in nine children in
the Netherlands is living with only one parent (Garssen and Sprangers, 2001).Demographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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6.1 Teenage fertility and conception
The Netherlands population is not much burdened with the problems of unwanted
fertility which afflict other countries. In particular it has one of the lowest rates of
teenage fertility in the world. Teenage childbearing in the Netherlands (about 6 per
thousand teenagers per year) is half the average for the 18 European countries (itself
low) and considerably below the levels of its neighbours in Western Europe. The only
country with a similarly low rate is Switzerland, a country that shares a number of
prudential characteristics with the Netherlands. Not surprisingly in the land of perfect
family planning, abortion levels are low as well (about 110 abortions per thousand live
births per year), again about half the European average. Only Belgium and the Republic
of Ireland are lower, although not by much, at least as far as official statistics are
concerned (abortion remains illegal in the Republic of Ireland but many Irish women
obtain abortions in England).
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This restraint from teenage childbearing is a long-standing Dutch characteristic,
maintained consistently for the last half century. In 1950 the fertility rate for girls aged
15-19 (12.4/1000) was already the lowest of the countries compared, and almost one
standard deviation below the European average. Since 1970 it has been consistently
over one standard deviation below the average (Figure 3). In the last few years,
however, this exceptional Dutch position has been eroded by a small upward trend in
teenage fertility. This is primarily due to the growing contribution by teenagers of non-
western origin, making up a seventh of all teenagers but contributing almost half of all
teenage births. The number of Antillean teenage mothers per thousand girls of the same
age, for example, is more than ten times as high as that among native Dutch teenagers.
A further consequence of very low teenage fertility and a generally very controlled
pattern of fertility at all ages is the symmetrical and smooth distribution of age-specific
fertility rates at single years of age. Some European populations display distortions,
apparently excess fertility at younger ages. Notable examples are the UK and the
Republic of Ireland. By contrast, the Netherlands has a more symmetrical distribution,
which might be regarded as an ideal or typical advanced European pattern (Figure 4).
Populations with distorted fertility profiles can be modelled as if they comprised two
separate populations with different age-schedules of fertility, for example by the
Hadwiger mixture model. The parameter c of the Hadwiger mixture model (which
determines the relative size of the two sub-populations) has been shown, in the
populations concerned, to correspond approximately to the proportions of births inside
and outside marriage. Because the age-structure of fertility of births outside marriage in
the Netherlands is not much different from that of legitimate births (Figure 5), no such
complex modelling is needed in the Dutch case in the 1990s (Chandola, Coleman and
Hiorns, 1999), although such a bulge was apparent in the 1970s.
6.2 Late childbearing
Dutch (first-time) mothers are amongst the oldest in the world (mean age at first birth
28.7 in 1998), together with mothers in Greece and Spain (both 28.9). Mothers in
France and Italy are close behind. Because second births are still common, mean age at
motherhood in general is over 30 (30.2 in 1998), only slightly below the mean ages in
Ireland (where TFR is higher) and Spain. Like many transitions in this account, this
peculiarity first became evident in the 1970s. Before that time, as we have seen, the
Netherlands was more distinguished, if anything, for its higher fertility at all ages. By
the end of the 1980s, mean age at first birth was already 1.5 years (one standard
deviation) higher than the European average. It has remained in this relative position
ever since (Figure 6). The proportion of all births occurring to older mothers (aged 30Demographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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Figure 4: ASFR, single years of age, the Netherlands and other countries, 1999
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years or over) has continued to increase further, as overall Dutch fertility has not fallen
to the same extent as elsewhere.  Even in 1950 the Netherlands was first in Europe (data
for 13 countries only), with 49.9% of births to older mothers. In the early 1990s the
Netherlands became the first low-fertility post-war population where over half of all
births were to older mothers. Its proportion is now 54%, about two standard deviations
over the EUR-18 average (Figure 7), although it no longer ranks first in Europe: Spain,
Italy and Ireland presently show proportions that are about two percentage points
higher.
This late beginning of childbearing is only about a few years below that age - from
the late thirties - when concerns begin about rising risks of secondary or primary
sterility (Beets, 1996). Such late motherhood may risk moving childbearing beyond its
optimum mean age from the viewpoint of the health of the child if not yet that of the
mother (Macfarlane and Mugford, 2000; Gustafsson, 2001). The ‘optimum’ age is that
at which mothers are likely to be most mature in a social and emotional sense, while
obstetric risks and the chance of infant mortality and birth defects are still relatively
low. With mortality so low, adverse effects on the mother’s health are perhaps not a
realistic concern. But the issue of age-related infecundity may be, and is attracting
increasing attention from demographers. Up to a point, the timing of births and the
eventual number of births are independent, in the sense that it is possible to start late
(but not too late) and have a large family by modern standards, and vice-versa. In the
Netherlands second and even third and higher parity births are still relatively common,
unlike (e.g.) in Italy where third and higher parity births are less common and where
variance in family size is accordingly less.
As childbearing is delayed, we expect the conventional period measure of fertility,
the TFR, to become temporarily depressed. In fact this effect is quite short-lived. In the
Netherlands, as in most other countries, there has been no halt to the continued advance
of first age at birth, although the decline in the TFR ended some years ago. For the past
thirty years first births have comprised about 44% of all births (46% in 2000).
Continuing delay of first birth now has no effect on the TFR, which is sustained by
rising birth rates among women in their thirties, especially second births (steady for the
past thirty years at about 35% of all births). Even fourth births have not declined since
the mid-1970s, although that might be a consequence in part of immigration. Births to
women aged 35-39, supposedly in terminal decline in the 1970s (20.3 per thousand in
1980) have almost tripled to 57.0 in 2000, more than 50% higher than the rate for
women aged 20-24.
It is generally expected that the birth rate in most European countries will recover
somewhat, as births postponed when women are in their twenties finally arrive when
those women are in their thirties. Various attempts have been made to estimate the
degree of this future recuperation of the birth rate by inspection of the family buildingDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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Figure 6: Mean age of mothers at first birth, 1950-1999, the Netherlands
and EUR-18, 1970-1999.
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patterns of younger cohorts of women and the proportions of women having second or
third births. The population of the Netherlands has postponed its births more than any
other European country but has also had the strongest ‘catching up’ or recuperation of
births to mothers over age 30. According to one analysis, the cohorts born in the 1960s
may well have on average 1.85 children (quite high for Europe) and maybe even more if
the process of postponement is slowing down (Lesthaeghe, 2001). This is slightly higher
than official projections. Other measures using data on birth order, however, give lower
estimates for the Netherlands (Kohler and Ortega, 2001).
6.3 Childlessness and one-child families
Until recently, childlessness has attracted little attention from researchers in the
Netherlands. Childless women form a minority, albeit a minority that is rapidly
increasing. Even so, the percentage of childless women is still considerably smaller than
that at the beginning of the twentieth century, a pattern that is common throughout
Europe. Of all Dutch women born at that time, over a quarter remained childless, a
proportion that fell to about one in ten by the middle of the century. At present, the
proportion is about one in six, among the highest observed in Europe. This proportion is
much higher than those recorded in Belgium and France (both about one in ten), but
lower than that in Germany (more than one in five).
In view of the fact that the present share of childless women is considerably above
the estimated five percent of all couples who are physically incapable of having children
(i.e. are infecund), it is not surprising that the recent increase in childlessness is
generally ascribed to conscious choice, having to do with the larger degree of freedom
among women to fulfil other roles than those related to family and household.
While it may be correct to attribute most of this childlessness to social rather than
to biological factors, it may not be appropriate to attribute all of it to positive conscious
decisions. Unavoidable, and to the women concerned undesirable, conflicts of interest
appear to lie behind childlessness in many couples. The most recent Dutch Family and
Fertility Survey shows that about half of the older cohorts of women state that their
childlessness has not been ‘voluntary’ in any positive sense of actively wishing to prefer
being ‘childfree’. Instead, the expected heavy burden of combining work and the care of
children, the requirements of time and energy, or a partner who is not prepared to share
in the responsibilities, are all important factors in explaining their childlessness (Keij
and De Graaf, 2001). This survey shows that in the Netherlands, as in other European
countries, the average woman would prefer to have at least two children (United
Nations/UNECE, 1996-1999).  Achieved fertility and childlessness is necessarily theDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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result of an interaction between desires and the actual conditions perceived by couples,
amplified by an element of unwanted fertility and diminished by infecundity.
A relatively strong correlation between fertility and marriage can still be observed
in the Netherlands: a majority of couples prefers to marry once a child is planned or
under way. Consequently, fewer than one in ten women who have been married for
fifteen years are still without children. The share of non-marital births in total fertility
(25% in 2000) is somewhat below the average for the EUR-18, a fact that would appear
to be in contradiction with the supposedly very liberal attitudes of the Dutch population.
On closer consideration, however, this phenomenon fits into a more general pattern
observed in the Netherlands. Tolerance of unconventional or at least different behaviour
has virtually become part of the social etiquette, a behaviour that is acceptable for other
people but not necessarily something to share. In matters pertaining to the family, most
Dutchmen clearly prefer to display a more traditional behaviour themselves. However
the situation is changing: the proportion of births outside marriage has more than
doubled since 1990, when it was 11%.
In a manner similar to that observed in other European countries, Dutch women
increasingly try to combine both modern and traditional roles. In doing so, children are
postponed to such an extent that a growing number of women no longer bear the number
of children that they would like to have. Like childlessness, the one-child family has in
only one in three cases been a conscious choice of the parents (Keij and De Graaf,
2001). More often, problems in becoming pregnant due to reduced fecundity as well as
divorce have limited the number of children. As Cuyvers (2001) states, fertility is
presently not only below replacement level, but also below the level that is desired at the
individual level. Looking at the national level, the postponement of children and
increasing divorce rates have had a considerable downward effect on the number of
births. Latten and Kreijen (2001) estimate the number of children who were, during the
past fifty years, not born due to postponement and divorce in the Netherlands at 750
thousand.
7. Natural growth and age-structure
The high Dutch birth rate earlier in the twentieth century has bequeathed to the
Netherlands a more youthful age-structure than some of its neighbours’. Population
growth and natural increase have been higher than average, with population trebling
over the century, and households multiplying sixfold. More ‘average’ European
countries, such as Germany and the UK, increased by only about 70%. The increase was
scarcely 50% in neighbouring Belgium, which has been demographically eclipsed.
Rather unusually, of course, land area increased by 6.5% over the period as well.  TheDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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excess of births over deaths generated 1.5% population growth in 1950, nearly double
the European average and more than one standard deviation away from the mean. Like
everything else, that changed at the end of the 1960s. But partly thanks to the youthful
age-structure which the earlier fertility has generated, the rate of natural increase (4.2
per thousand in 2000) remains well above the European average (about 1 per thousand;
Figure 8), even though the TFR is only just above the EUR-18 average. The strong
effect of this positive natural increase on population growth is enhanced by net
immigration of almost the same magnitude. Policy and opinion was set against further
population growth, and recent policy developments attempt to limit further immigration
and encourage return. Nonetheless, net immigration has strongly increased in recent
years, from 14 thousand in 1995 to 54 thousand in 2000
Figure 8: Rates of natural increase 1950-1999, the Netherlands and
EUR-18, 1950-2000
Consequently, in the past half-century the Dutch population, with its more youthful
age-structure, has had a lower old-age dependency burden than its European neighbours.
In 1950 the Dutch potential support ratio - the number of persons aged 15-64 to those
aged 65 or above - was 8.1, more similar to the ratios in Southern Europe (which then
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Europe (Table 1). This relatively favourable position has been maintained since then,
with the Netherlands consistently enjoying a dependency burden one standard deviation
lighter than that of the rest of Europe (Figure 9). At present only Ireland (6.0 in 2000)
and Iceland (5.6) have more favourable support ratios than the Netherlands (5.1). Over
fifty years, the Dutch burden has increased by ‘only’ 63%, whereas the average for
Southern Europe more than doubled.
Figure 9: Potential Support Ratio, the Netherlands and EUR-18, 1950-2000
This means that in the short to medium turn, the Netherlands can face the issue of
population ageing with more equanimity than some of its neighbours. In the longer run
the relatively low TFR, if unchanged, will generate an age-structure that compares
slightly less well than formerly with the rest of Europe. The share in the total population
of those aged 65 or above is projected to increase from today’s very favourable 13.4%
to 24.4% in 2050, from rank 14 (out of 17) in 2000 to rank 11 in 2050 (De Beer and De
Jong, 1996). Comparisons of the future predicted old-age dependency burden, however,
come to more pessimistic conclusions, although made at a time when immigration was
substantially underestimated (Gonnot, Prinz and Keilman, 1995). Dutch researchers
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risk of being squashed by a duty of care for children under 20 plus one or more parents
75 or over. One in five persons aged 40-64 was (potentially) in this position in 1990.
One in three will be in 2040, then fewer. Thus all bad things come to an end, although
that will be little consolation to many.
A TFR of 1.72 with constant mortality implies a stable population declining at a
rate of nearly 0.7% per year, with about 15% of the population in the childhood ages,
25% aged 65 or above and about 2.4 nominal workers per old age dependent,
corresponding to 1.7 or fewer actual workers per pensioner. In fact, without an increase
in fertility the future will be more difficult than that, because no end is in sight to the
gains in survival which make the population ever-older and prevent it achieving a stable
state.  Population projections made at about the same time differ somewhat in outlook.
The United Nations 2000-based medium variant projection assumed a rise in fertility to
1.81  by 2045-2050, expectation of life at birth rising to 79.6 and 84.9 respectively for
males and females and a constant annual net migration of 30 thousand (The 1996-based
UN projection assumed an increase of TFR to 2.1 and a reduction in net migration to
zero). The assumptions of the UN 2000-based projections generate a population size in
2050 of 16 million, as today, with 26.5% aged 65 or above - about double the current
proportion (UN 2001). In this UN projection the Dutch population is expected to peak
at 16.6 million in 2030. The most recent projection prepared by Statistics Netherlands
(Steenhof and De Jong, 2001), however, assumes the TFR to stabilise around 1.75 and
net immigration to converge to 30 thousand per year. This forecasts 18 million by 2035
and about the same size by 2050. The largest share of persons aged 65 or above in the
total population (23%) will be reached by 2040. The relative position of the Netherlands
within Europe is not much affected either way.
8. Marriage and divorce
In the divergent family patterns of modern Europe (Kuijsten, 1996) the Netherlands
occupies a middle position. Marriage without cohabitation is becoming rare,
cohabitation without subsequent marriage is becoming common. In its broad statistical
outlines, there seems to be nothing unusual about marriage in the Netherlands. Mean
age at first marriage is highly communautaire, being very close to the European
average. In mean age it is exceeded by Denmark, Sweden and Norway, where marriage
is becoming a minority status. Dutch statistical conformism has been evident at least
since the 1960s - earlier data are not sufficiently complete for comparison - except for a
short period of relatively early marriage, from about 1970 to about 1985 (Figure 10).
The intensity of marriage, as measured by the total first marriage rate for females (0.60
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(0.58) in that year, but well below the average for Southern Europe (0.69). This estimate
of proportions marrying has followed the post-war European trend to a slightly
exaggerated degree, higher than average (about 1.1) up to about 1970, sharply declining
in the 1970s and reaching about today’s level as early as 1980 (Figure 11).
Divorce, as measured by the total divorce rate, is at 0.36 about the same as the
European average of 0.35. However, as the European average is strongly deflated by
very low rates in Southern Europe (average 0.15), the Netherlands only rank eleventh in
this respect. Like the total first marriage rate, the total divorce rate shows signs of
stabilising in the past decade, along with a number of other countries of Northern and
Western Europe. These total period rates, which indicate the current intensity of the
process by showing the implication of current rates for lifetime accumulation, do
remove the influence of age-structure but nonetheless conflate the experiences of several
different cohorts, who are imagined to live through one lifetime.  However, such is the
diversity of family arrangements in the modern Netherlands that the annual number of
divorces in the 1990s (about 30 thousand) is already exceeded by the annual number of
broken cohabiting partnerships (about 40 thousand). The latter are, of course, well
known to be much more prone to break up: at least twice as much.
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Figure 11: Total first marriage rates females, the Netherlands and
EUR-18, 1960-1999
9. Cohabitation, family and household
In the Netherlands, as in much of the rest of Western Europe, no single sequence of
family household formation is yet emerging, thus creating the biggest diversity of
personal experience for centuries. Marriage that is not preceded by cohabitation has
become exceptional, largely limited to persons with a foreign or orthodox religious
background. The diversity in personal experience is furthermore increased by the
growing custom to live alone for some time before entering into a partnership: more
than half of those who leave the parental home first set up a single person household.
Cohabitation and marriage are increasingly postponed, although this does not result in a
higher percentage of persons who are permanently single. As in most other Western and
Northern European countries, this process has had a major impact on the number of
small households. One in five households in the Netherlands presently consist of only
one person, a much larger share than in any Southern European country. The size of the
average Dutch household is now 2.3 persons, similar to that in neighbouring countries
but much smaller than in Ireland, Portugal or Spain, where the average household size
































Netherlands Average EUR-18 Mean + 1 s d Mean - 1 s dDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
http://www.demographic-research.org 454
in these countries, is very exceptional in the Netherlands. This strengthens the
impression that, despite living in a crowded country, the Dutch seem to be disinclined to
economise on space by living with their relatives, or indeed with anyone else. In one of
the most crowded areas of the Netherlands, the city of Amsterdam, average household
size has even fallen below two persons.
Rather surprising in view of the liberal values that are supposedly held by the
Dutch, are the conformist, if not bourgeois practices with respect to sexual relations and
family formation. During the past thirty years, an almost constant 70% of all cohabitants
have eventually married. For most people, therefore, cohabitation resembles a trial
marriage, rather than an alternative living arrangement. The moment of turning
cohabitation into marriage is often determined by children. Once a child is planned or
on the way, the large majority of cohabitants arrange a wedding. Other aspects of
personal life also seem fairly ‘bourgeois’; for example the fact that the ‘average’ woman
has only one serious relationship in her life, and that she has her children with the first
partner. Only about 15 to 20 percent of all women have eventually had more than one
serious relationship (Alders and De Graaf, 2001).
10. Immigration and ethnic minorities
Along with other countries in Western Europe, the Netherlands is a traditional
emigration country that has become de facto a somewhat reluctant immigration country.
Emigration was encouraged and subsidised by the Netherlands government from the
1950s (as in the UK) up to 1992, in response to the belief that population growth was
problematic and a smaller population would be desirable. In net terms, however, since
the mid-nineteenth century emigration was never substantial compared with other
countries of Northern and Western Europe. Hence, in part, the rapid population growth
of the Netherlands.
10.1 The pattern of immigration
Immigration from outside Europe was a novelty to the Netherlands in the early post-war
period, following a pattern familiar in outline in other countries. Initially dominated by
colonial connections, it began in the early 1950s with Moluccans (originally 12.5
thousand) and Eurasians (between 200 and 300 thousand) from Indonesia. These were
followed, relatively late, in the 1970s by migration from the former colony of Surinam,
until special entry rights were ended in 1980, and from the Netherlands Antilles, the
only remaining overseas territories of the Netherlands. In addition, the NetherlandsDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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recruited guest workers during the economic growth of the 1960s, first from Southern
Europe and then from Turkey and Morocco (for a review of the development of
migration to The Netherlands, see Lucassen and Penninx, 1997). ‘The Netherlands
never deliberately attracted permanent migrants […] but contrary to past policy
objectives, immigration to the Netherlands acquired a more permanent nature’,
complained the Netherlands Government in its report to the Cairo conference (1994,
p.18) - a common European experience, in Germany and elsewhere.
As in other countries, migration is now strongly positive, dominated by the
continued migration of dependants and increasingly by spouse migration for the
growing younger generation. In the mid-1990s net immigration was about 7 per
thousand population, around the middle of the European range; less than Germany,
Austria and Denmark per capita, more than Belgium, Sweden and the UK. However, in
the early 1990s overall immigration, especially from Turkey and Morocco, significantly
declined (Muus, 1995), but more recently it has increased again. In most of the past
twenty years, the Netherlands has absorbed between 8% and 13% of Europe’s legal
migrants, corresponding to a net gain of about 840 thousand foreign population.
The present European pattern of net migration is highly divergent, with marked
declines in some (especially Germany, thanks to the return of displaced persons to the
Balkans) and sharp increases in others (e.g. the UK). The official Dutch view, that
immigration makes an unhelpfully large contribution to the rate of population growth, is
unusually blunt. As a result of migration, the expected decline in population growth
arising from low fertility, otherwise due earlier this century, is unlikely to take place
before 2030. The Netherlands is no stranger to explicit repatriation polices either, the
most recent legislation to encourage return being enacted in 1999.
Other governments (e.g. the UK) have toyed vaguely with supposed ‘demographic
needs’ as a pretext for further immigration. The Dutch government, better informed
demographically, realises that immigration cannot be used as an instrument to combat
the current trend of population ageing and has explicitly stated that it is not considering
a policy of selected admission based on the ‘demographic interests’ of the Netherlands
(Netherlands Government, 1994, pp.10-11,18-19). Dutch demographers have been
prominent in showing the inability of immigration to make much impact on trends in
population ageing (Kuijsten, 1995) and associated social security problems (Van Imhoff
and Keilman, 1996).
As in many countries, the more traditional forms of immigration have been greatly
supplemented by an inflow of asylum seekers. The cumulative total of claims in the
Netherlands alone are close to 500 thousand since 1980, rising from a small proportion
to about 10% of all claims made in Western Europe. In 2001, the Netherlands were,
within Europe, in fourth position with respect to the number of claims, after the UK,
Germany and France, and in third position in relative terms (Figure 12). Policy has beenDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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active in attempting to limit the inflow of asylum seekers, speed up the admission
procedure, pre-screen manifestly ill-founded applications and remove rejected persons
quickly. Detention camps and limited benefits were credited with a sharp reduction in
asylum claims in 1995 and 1996 but, as elsewhere in Europe, numbers have since risen
again. The effect on immigration is considerable, but the actual numbers of immigrants
are hard to determine. About four out of every ten asylum seekers are admitted. These
four official immigrants generate a further two immigrants, through family formation
and reunion (Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2002). Apart from these legal immigrants, a
considerable number of persons stay illegally in the country, in some cases following the
rejection of their asylum claims. Hence, while comparison of trends in international
migration is very difficult, it is clear that net immigration to the Netherlands is
substantial by European standards, despite the apparently firm policy to limit it (as in
the UK up to 1997; Coleman, 1997). Judging how it has responded to policy measures
to control it, compared with other countries, would need a special study.
Figure 12: Number of asylum applications per 100 thousand inhabitants, 2000
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10.2 The foreign population and immigrant policy
As a consequence, the population of foreign origin in the Netherlands is now very large.
In 2001 the foreign population (both first and second generation) numbered almost 3
million, or 18%. About half of them are of non-western origin. This non-western
component is forecast to grow to 2.3 million by 2015, or 13.5% of the total population,
by then accounting for all population growth (Alders, 2001). The population of foreign
nationality in 2000, however, was just 652 thousand or 4.1% of the population, less than
half that in neighbouring Belgium (8.3%) and Germany (8.9%). According to these
figures, a decade of net immigration from 1990, which added 580 thousand foreign
citizens to the Dutch population, has increased the foreign population total by just 10
thousand. This statistical absurdity follows from the energetic naturalisation policy,
which reduces the foreign population statistically (without reducing the number of
persons of foreign origin) as fast as international migration increases it. By this process
the foreign presence is understated in many countries. France is another example, but
until recently Germany, Austria and Switzerland much less so. In reality, the Dutch
proportion of population of foreign origin is much closer to that in Germany, where
naturalisation has had more demanding criteria.
The Dutch government’s integration policy for permanent immigrants is unusual in
that it has been made explicitly multicultural, recognising ‘ethnic minorities’ with
‘group rights’. Here it has gone further than the UK, which has adopted multiculturalism
by stealth. However, in the past decade this Dutch policy appears to have slowly eroded,
following a hardening of public opinion against measures regarded as excess privileges
enjoyed by minorities (Dieleman, 1993), even though demographic data are used for
ethnic monitoring (Van Wersch, 1994). Dual nationality law has been revised twice.
Despite all that, however, measures of integration remains very uneven in the
various population groups. Towards the end of the 1990s, some of the highest rates of
foreign unemployment in Europe were found among minorities in the Netherlands
(Turks 18% and Moroccans 15%, against 2% in the native population). Integration as
measured by marriages with native Dutch are also highly varied. The large majority of
Turks and Moroccans, including the second generation, choose a partner of the same
ethnic background. Mixed marriages among Antilleans and Surinamese, on the other
hand, are much more common. These mixed marriages are, furthermore, much more
likely to end in divorce than marriages between persons of the same background: three
out of four marriages between a Turkish or Moroccan man and a native Dutch woman,
for example, end in divorce within a period of ten years (Harmsen, 1999). Likewise the
trends in convergence of TFR of immigrant populations is mixed, that of Surinamese
having converged with the Dutch average, that of Turks and Moroccans remaining much
higher, while that of Italians and Spaniards in the Netherlands has fallen below theDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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national average. Comparisons are obviously difficult, but in these respects the
Netherlands shared some experiences with the UK, one of the few other European
countries to have immigrant minorities from the West Indies (Coleman, 1994b). There,
West Indian populations have very high rates of inter-ethnic unions with natives and
moderate birth rates, while Muslim populations retain high birth rates and low levels of
inter-ethnic union. The latter is a widespread phenomenon throughout Europe
(Coleman, 1994a).
11. Conclusions
The Netherlands at the beginning of the 21st century presents an interesting
demographic picture of a modern European society. Can we regard it as a paradigmatic
case of the European experience, as a model to which other populations will converge?
In many respects, on the world scale, its demographic characteristics place it firmly in
the European mainstream, with fairly average overall levels of mortality and fertility,
and an immigration situation not startlingly different from that of other Northern and
Western European countries. However, we have noted above a number of points where
the Netherlands does depart from the European norm. The Dutch tend to have low out-
of-wedlock fertility, associated with late first birth, but without giving the very low
completed fertility found in some other countries where most births are confined to
marriage. While generally tolerant of the ‘modern’ behaviour of other peoples, they
prefer a more traditional style themselves in the sense that they cohabit without having
many of their children in such unions. Good contraceptive use is a necessary condition
for this state of affairs. In these respects the Dutch differ from the pathological situation
in the UK of poor contraceptive use and high teenage fertility, and also from the
contrasting fertility patterns of Scandinavia and of Southern Europe with their very
different welfare systems and assumptions about the role of the family.
Is it possible to say which predominate; the similarities or the differences? A more
multidimensional view does show that the Netherlands does stand out from the flock to
some extent. The overall similarity or difference of the Netherlands compared with
other European countries can be assessed by taking into account information from
several demographic variables at once. There are several ways of doing this. One of
them, multidimensional scaling (MDS), can provide a visual representation of the
pattern of (dis)similarities between several countries (or other entities) using several
variables together (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). The input is a square symmetrical matrix
of statistical dissimilarities computed from demographic data. The variables used here
include population density, total fertility rate, age-specific fertility rate aged 15-19,
percent of births over age 30, proportion of births outside marriage, rate of naturalDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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increase, total first marriage rate, female age at first marriage, crude divorce rate,
expectation of life at birth (both sexes), infant mortality rate and aged and youth
dependency ratios.
The graphical output (Figures 13a, 13b) shows the Euclidean distances in two
dimensions between the countries chosen. Through an iterative process this two-
dimensional representation is made to correspond as closely as possible to the statistical
information on the dissimilarities between each pair of countries. The axes against
which the countries are plotted have no intrinsic meaning and the orientation is
arbitrary. It is the clustering, or conversely isolation, that matters. Near-neighbours in
the diagram are statistically similar, those further apart less so. The closeness of fit
between the graphical representation and the matrix of similarities is known as ‘stress’.
It may not be possible to represent the pattern of dissimilarities in just two dimensions,
of course, at an acceptable level of ‘stress’.  But in these examples the fit between the
distances on the two-dimensional diagram and the computed statistical distances,
measured as the ‘stress’ level, although not perfect, permits a two-dimensional solution.
The value of ‘stress’ is 0.16 both in 1950 and in 1995, corresponding to r
2 values of
0.88 and 0.89 respectively. That is considered to indicate an adequate fit (0.0 would be
perfect, up to 0.2 is regarded as ‘acceptable’; the criterion is somewhat arbitrary). This
common set of demographic variables on fertility, mortality and population structure
consistently shows that the Netherlands is somewhat distinct from the broad mass of
European countries (Figures 13a, 13b). This restricted set of variables shows that the
demographic characteristics of the Netherlands place it away from the centre and closer
to Switzerland rather than to its geographical neighbours Belgium or Germany, both in
1950 and in 1995.  Other European countries occupy positions considerably more
remote, it must be noted. For the most part these are the ‘usual suspects’ in any study of
European demographic deviancy such as Iceland and the Irish Republic, on the edge of
Europe’s demography as on the edge of its geography. Their statistically peripheral
position is familiar, even though its explanation can be taxing.
Some Dutch idiosyncrasies, inherited from the past, can hardly be shared with
other European countries. These include, for example, the relatively favourable age-
structure and relatively high natural increase, the distinctiveness of which will fade as
time goes on. Where the Netherlands may point the way for the rest of Europe is in the
age-pattern of fertility and the exceptional degree of its control. The very low level of
teenage births would be greatly welcomed in other European countries. All Western
populations appear to be acquiring a very late pattern of overall fertility. It cannot be
imagined that much further delay in births can be achieved if any substantial proportion
of women are to fulfil their declared ambition of having two children, so theDemographic Research – Volume 7, Article 12
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Figure 13a: Multidimensional Scaling Configurations of the Netherlands’
demographic place in Europe, 1995
Derived Stimulus configuration. Euclidean Distance Model.
Stress 0.16  R2 0.89
Labels 1 AUT, 2 BEL, 3 DEN, 4 FIN, 5 FRA, 6 GRE, 7 ICE, 8 IRE, 9 ITA, 10 LUX, 11 NL, 12 NOR, 13 POR, 14 SPA, 15 SWE, 16
SWI, 17 UK, 18 FRG.
Variables exclude mean age at first birth (not available for Belgium and Luxemburg)
Netherlands may be close to the ne plus ultra, at which point some further recovery of
period fertility rates may be expected.
It seems surprising that the second demographic transition, although more or less
invented in the Low Countries by Van de Kaa (e.g. 1994) and Lesthaeghe (e.g. 1995),
has only been embraced by the Dutch themselves to a relatively modest degree.
Cohabitation and divorce remain at an average European level. The percentage of births
outside marriage is relatively low, about the same as in Belgium, Germany and
Luxemburg and much lower than the exuberant extra-marital fertility exhibited in
Scandinavia, France and, in a different context, in the UK. This does not appear to
follow from any marked degree of sexual inhibition among the Dutch population. Yet,
there may well be, in our view, a certain ‘cognitive dissonance’ between the liberal
values that the Dutch consider appropriate for others – and for society at large – and the
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Figure 13b: Multidimensional Scaling Configuration to show the Netherlands’
demographic place in Europe, 1950.
Stress = 0.1911, r2 = 0.81
Key: 1 AUT, 2 DEN, 3 FIN, 4 FRA, 5 GRE, 6 ICE, 7 IRE, 8 ITA, 9 NL, 10 NOR, 11 POR, 12 ESP, 13 SWE, 14 UK, 15 FRG
more conservative values that they find appropriate for themselves. The historically
strong influence of Calvinism may no longer be visible in socio-economic matters, but
continues to play an important role in personal norms and values. Consequently, cultural
conservatism, conventional behaviour with respect to family matters and rejection of
hedonism remain to form a clearly recognizable cluster of views (Felling et al., 2000).
The Scandinavian countries are often regarded as the model for the future
demographic patterns of the whole continent. In this view all Europe, including the
Netherlands, will eventually acquire a more fragmented and diverse pattern of family
and household structures than at present. Up to the present, however, European
demographic patterns seem to retain a certain loyalty to place, in the sense that some of
today’s characteristic national demographic patterns were evident in more modest form
in the earlier history of the populations concerned (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002). For
example Southern Europe, whether Catholic or Orthodox, has remained relatively
resistant to new forms of family. Furthermore, while welfare and fertility in most of
Scandinavia continue to prosper, the system in Sweden may perhaps have overstepped
the mark. In the 1990s domestic political developments and economic challenges
unsettled the traditional and expensive welfare consensus. Fertility in Sweden has fallen
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to an unprecedented low; Sweden for the time being at least no longer looks like the
herald of the future. Questions have also been raised, in particular in respect of the
pattern of lone parenthood more common in the English-speaking world, about the costs
of more varied forms of family life in terms of welfare transfers and on the prospects of
the children brought up in them (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001). It may be that the
Netherlands’ more constrained behaviour will be a more typical marker for the future,
and in view of these costs of the ‘second demographic transition’, perhaps a more
sustainable or necessary one.
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